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Abstract
This paper explores the empirical association between Internet use, e-government
and corruption in a large panel of countries covering the 1998-2003 period. We show
that higher numbers of internet users and higher levels of e-government are associated
with signicantly lower levels of corruption. Controlling for most variables used in pre-
vious work on corruption and addressing the endogeneity issue, results are shown to be
robust and to carry economic signicance. This leads us to conclude that well-designed
ICT policies are likely to bring substantial benets in the ght against corruption.
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"Thanks to the [e-government] scheme, the government is cutting sta¤ (through natural attrition,
so far). But for Mr. Naidu [chief minister of Andhra Pradesh] and his admirers the main goals are
transparency, accountability and speediness, and to reduce the interfacebetween government
and citizenry. This puzzling phrase recognizes a sad truth: where public and government meet,
corruption plays gooseberry. Not only do computers rarely solicit bribes but they make corruption
more di¢ cult [...]." (The Economist, March 20, 2003)
1 Introduction
The argument put forward in the present paper is that an increase in the use of information
and communication technology (ICT) is likely to reduce corruption. We identify two main
channels through which ICT a¤ects corruption. The rst channel is outlined in the passage
above: ICT simply reduces the interface between government and citizenry. The second
channel recognizes that ICT increases the amount of information in the economy, which in
turn is likely to make the government more accountable. This second channel is related
to recent work by inter alia Besley and Burgess (2001, 2002), Strömberg (2001, 2004) and
Svensson and Reinikka (2003).
Wescott (2003) provides a long list of anecdotal evidence suggesting the importance of
the interface channel. In Pakistan for instance the entire tax department is undergoing
restructuring and ICT systems are being introduced with the purpose of reducing contact
between tax collectors and tax payers. In the Philippines the Department of Budget and
Management has established an on-line e-procurement system that allows public bidding
for suppliers. This system has increased transparency in transactions. In South Korea the
Online Procedures Enhancement for Civil Applications allows ordinary citizens to monitor
applications for permits or approvals where corruption is most likely to take place; it also
allows questions to be raised in case irregularities are detected. In the Indian state of
Andhra Pradesh, where 40% of the 76 million people cannot read, 214 deed registration
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o¢ ces have been fully computerized. Deeds are registered in one hour; other services like
encumbrance certicates are accomplished in just 15 minutes. The process started in April
1998 and as of February 2000 about 700,000 documents had been registered. Before the
introduction of online registration, the opaqueness of property valuation forced citizens to
employ middlemen who used corrupt practices to obtain services. Several Asian countries
are also introducing smart cards that help citizens to get health-care services without having
to provide corruption-prone cash payments for these services.
Another interesting scheme (eSeva) has been implemented in Andhra Pradesh. At any
of the eSeva centres, located around the state, there are a dozen counters where clerks at
computer terminals assist the 600,000 households who visit monthly in completing any of a
menu of 32 transactions with the government. Among other things, citizens can pay utility
bills and register births and deaths at the centres (The Economist, March 20, 2003).
Perhaps the most impressive example of the potential of ICT in empowering citizens to
challenge corrupt and arbitrary bureaucratic action is the Bhoomi (meaning land) system
from the Karnataka state in India, where the introduction of an electronic land record system
serving some 7 million farmers has saved clients some 1.32 million work days in waiting time
and Rs. 806 million in bribes (World Bank, 2004).1 The main function of the Bhoomi system
is to maintain records of rights, tenancy and cultivation, which are crucial for transferring or
inheriting land and obtaining loans. Under the old system some 9,000 village accountants,
each serving three or four villages, maintained land records. Farmers had to seek out a
village accountant in order to obtain a copy of the record or make changes. Accountants
were not easily accessible and farmers faced long delays; two out of three paid bribes, and
over two-thirds paid more than Rs. 100, compared to the o¢ cial service fee of Rs. 2. Under
the electronic Bhoomi system farmers can enter a Bhoomi kiosk and get these records or le
1See Chawla and Bhatnager (2004) for a case study of the Bhoomi system.
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for changes in 5-30 minutes. Moreover, all requests are served on a rst-come, rst-served
basis.2
The use of ICT by governments around the world is in fact surprisingly widespread.
An inuential United Nations (2002) report denes e-government as: "utilizing the Internet
and the World-Wide-Web for delivering government information and services to citizens".
The report introduces a ve-step classication of stages of e-government: (i) emerging:
a government Web presence is established through a few independent o¢ cial sites, and
information is limited, basic and static; (ii) enhanced : content and information is updated
with greater regularity; (iii) interactive: users can download forms, contact o¢ cials, and
make appointments and requests; (iv) transactional : users can pay for services or conduct
nancial transactions online; (v) seamless: complete integration of e-functions and services
across administrative and departmental boundaries.3
According to the report, in 2001, 32 countries were classied as emerging; 64 were en-
hanced; 55 were classied as interactive; 17 were classied as transactional; no country was
classied as seamless. This means that in 2001, 72 countries actually allowed its citizens
to interact with the government via the Internet. India, Pakistan and the Philippines, for
instance, were classied as interactive due to the presence of systems like the Bhoomi system,
the online tax reporting system and the on-line e-procurement system, respectively.4
2Other examples include: Christal in Argentina, a Web site aiming at disseminating online informa-
tion concerning the use of public funds; the Central Vigilance Commission Web site in India, where the
public among other things can report information about wrongdoings of public servants; an on-line Cus-
toms Bureau system in the Philippines, which has lessened the cost of trade for businesses, reduced op-
portunities for fraud and boosted revenue collection of the Customs Bureau; and several computerized
interstate check posts in Gujarat, India, which has signicantly reduced corruption at check posts. See
<http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/egov/anticorruption&t.htm> for more information on these and
other initiatives.
3The e-government classication is based on an examination of over 1,900 UN member country Web sites.
4Interestingly, the report notes that 2001 saw a greater expansion in government online presence than in
the previous ve years combined. We should therefore expect that a substantial number of countries can be
classied as interactive in 2003 (our dataset span 1998-2003). Moreover, Fink and Kenny (2003) argue that
despite much talk of a widening absolute digital divide, poorer countries are actually closing the divide in
3
There is also an abundance of anecdotal evidence documenting the importance of the
information channel. In a recent edition of the New York Times Pulitzer Prize winner
Nicholas D. Kristof told the fascinating story of a Chinese investigative journalist, Li Xinde,
who maintains an anti-corruption Web site, which targets o¢ cial corruption in China (New
York Times, May 24, 2005).5 Mr. Li travels around China with a laptop and a digital camera,
investigating cases of o¢ cial wrongdoing. He then writes about them on his Web site and
leaves town before the local authorities can arrest him. Recently Mr. Li was instrumental in
exposing a corruption case involving the deputy mayor of Jining, a large Chinese city. Mr.
Lis Web site published an investigative report and a series of photos showing the deputy
mayor kneeling and crying, apparently begging not to be reported to the police. This caused
a sensation and the deputy mayor was subsequently arrested. By conning the content of
the site to factual exposures of corruption, never questioning the partys rule, the Web site is
tolerated by the Communist Party. According to Kristof, the Li Xinde story shows that the
Internet is beginning to play the watchdog role in China that the press plays in the West.
Another interesting example is the scam-busting Indian Web site Tehelka (meaning sen-
sation in Hindi) <http:nnwww.tehelka.com>, which has revealed corruption in defence deals
and showing top o¢ cials accepting kickbacks. The Web site posted videotapes showing
politicians, bureaucrats, military o¢ cers and middlemen seeking and taking bribes from
arms dealers; the arms dealers were in fact Tehelka journalists (New York Times, February
13, 2003).
That the Internet is a powerful mass media is undisputed. To illustrate, consider the
remarkable incident which took place in China recently. A brush with a tractor apparantly
relative terms.
5A blog (short for Web log) is a mix between a diary and a list of links to articles on the Web. Anyone
surng the Web can read them. Some are serious and informative; others are not. According to the Economist
(July 4, 2002) there were half a million blogs in 2002. According to India Monitor (May 17, 2005) there are
some 8 million blogs worldwide in 2005.
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caused such rage in the mind of a wealthy Chinese that she decided to plough her car into a
group of poor unemployed workers waiting for work on a street corner in a poor city north-
east of Bejing. The incidence caused death and serious injury. The court ruling, giving the
women a suspended sentence for killing two and injuring 12, triggered a massive outpouring
of rage on the Internet. Soon after Chinese newspapers followed suit and eventually the
government succumbed to the pressure and announced that the case would be re-examined
(The Economist, January 29, 2004).
A similar incidence concerns a clash, in the village of Shengyou in Hebei Province, between
peasants and hundreds of armed thugs sent by property developers to seize their land. A
video smuggled out by one of the villagers shows his fellow residents being beaten with
staves and shovels; shotguns red by some of the thugs can also be heard. Six villagers were
killed and around 50 were wounded. With copies of the video circulating on the Internet
the authorities reacted promptly: a mayor and a Communist Party chief of the municipality
to which the village belongs were sacked. The o¢ cial media reported that 22 people had
been arrested, including the bosses of a rm contracted by a local state-owned power plant
to build a waste-processing plant on the village elds (The Economist, June 23, 2005).
New regulations in China now require owners of blogs to register with the government.
The move is widely seen as an attempt to regulate blogging.6 Yet only 430,000 bloggers have
made themselves known to the Chinese Information Ministry, suggesting that most of the
countries 4 million bloggers are choosing to stay "underground". This probably reects that
bloggers are betting on not getting caught (The Australian, June 06, 2005). By extension,
it reects the di¢ culties of regulating the Internet: despite strict censorship of the press
Libya has not blocked the sites that regularly ridicule, question and insult the government;
6In fact, claiming to be acting in accordance with its principle of respecting local laws, Microsoft has
agreed to block the words "democracy" and "freedom" on its new Internet portal in China (The Economist,
June 17, 2005).
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despite massive rewalls the Saudi authorities, having blocked over 400,000 Web sites, are
not able to prevent al-Queda from communicating and spreading propaganda through the
Internet; and in Syria, where lots of sites are banned, street vendors sell programmes that
cover electronic trails on the Internet for just one dollar, allowing surfers to peek at the
forbidden stu¤ (The Economist, July 8, 2004).7
Despite all these encouraging stories ICT may also open up new channels through which
bribes can travel. The Economist (June 11, 2005) reported a story about a mother who was
separated from her daughter by war in Congo (Democratic Republic). Following the peace
accord the mother booked an aeroplane ticket for the daughter to rejoin her. As the girl was
about to board the plane she was detained by an obstructive o¢ cial. He was willing to let
the girl board the plane for a bribe of US$ 20. Realizing that the little girl had no cash,
the o¢ cial made the mother send an equivalent of US$ 20 by mobile telephone: the mother
simply had to "recharge" the o¢ cials mobile phone with prepaid airtime. It took minutes
to send the bribe across the country, and since there is no proper banking system in Congo
the transaction would not even have been possible without mobile phones.
To be sure, ICT eliminates many opportunities for corruption for those who do not
understand the new technology well; at the same time, however, it introduces new rents to
those who understand the new technology well enough to manipulate it. Whether on balance
ICT reduces corruption is evidently an empirical question, and one which we entertain in
this paper. In particular, we investigate the two channels identied above and ask whether
countries with more ICT face less corruption? The answer is in the a¢ rmative, and we
therefore explore whether this statistical association can be considered to be causal, with
7In Canada, an Internet blog-site dubbed "Captains Quarters" posted explosive details on a secret judicial
commission in Montreal investigating a huge political corruption scandal. The Canadian press was banned
from reporting on the commission hearings, but the blocker was able to ignore the ban by setting up a site
on the U.S. side of the border (The Economist, April 7, 2004).
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causality running from more ICT to less corruption.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on the determinants
of corruption with a special focus on mass media. Section 3 describes the data and discusses
the empirical model. Section 4 presents results and Section 5 concludes. The Appendix
reports robustness issues.
2 Selected Literature Review
2.1 Mass media
We are not familiar with any academic literature on the role of the interface channel. This
is not so for the information channel. The Internet falls under the general classication of
mass media and there is a nascent economic literature on the e¤ects of mass media on the
responsiveness of politicians and governance.8
Besley and Burgess (2002) propose a political agency cost model to focus on the role of
the mass media in increasing political responsiveness. In their setup increased information
enables vulnerable citizens to monitor the actions of opportunistic politicians and to use this
in their voting decisions. That is, mass media enable voters to obtain information about
the performance of politicians. Only a fraction of voters are vulnerable: they risk being hit
by a shock, whose consequences can be mitigated by public action (e¤ort). The incumbent
politician derives positive utility from holding o¢ ce and disutility from putting in e¤ort.
Provided that there is su¢ cient political competition the model predicts that e¤ort by an
incumbent politician is an increasing function of media access, voter turnout and the relative
size of the group of vulnerable voters. Using Indian data covering the 1958-1992 period they
8The Internet is also used increasingly by editors and publishers of conventional media in developing
countries. For instance, the Daily Graphic in Ghana and the Peoples Daily in China are published on a
Web site (Wilson, 2004).
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show that more responsive states (measured by how the individual states responded to food
shortages via the public distribution of food) have higher electoral turnout, higher literacy
and higher levels of newspaper circulation.
In a similar vein Strömberg (2004) studies radios impact on public spending decisions.
Using a voting model he shows that mass media help increase the information of voters and
thereby inuence government policies towards favouring areas with more informed voters.
For a group of voters to defend their political interests they must cast a vote. Furthermore,
voters must hold information with respect to what their elected representatives have done
for them. If better informed citizens are more likely to vote, and if citizens with greater
access to the media are more informed, then it is more costly for politicians to neglect voters
with access to political information via the media. Testing the model on 2,500 US counties
between 1920 and 1940, a period in which the radio gained huge popularity, he shows that
data corroborates the predictions of the model. More resources were allocated to areas
where a larger proportion of the population had radios. Moreover, areas with a larger share
of literate people and with higher voter turnout were favoured in terms of relief funds.
Svensson and Reinikka (2003) analyze the value of increased information in a Ugandan
setting. A survey of 250 government primary schools and 3 central government ministries
was implemented in 1996 (covering the period 1991-1995). The objective of the survey was
to measure the di¤erence between intended resources (from the central government) and
resources actually received (by the school). Svensson and Reinikka show that for every dollar
spent on non-wage education items by the central government around 80 cents were captured
by local government o¢ cials and politicians. As the extent of the local government capture
became known the central government decided on a strategy of citizen empowerment. Data
on monthly transfers were made available at the local level by publishing the information
in national newspapers and their local language editions. This information campaign was
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subsequently extended. Primary schools were mandated to post notices on actual receipts of
funds for all to see. In e¤ect, information on transfers by the central government was made
public in newspapers while posted notices made it clear what had actually been received
by the school. Importantly, there was a concurrent increase in the likelihood that o¢ cials
caught embezzling public funds would be held accountable. A repeat survey carried out in
2002 was able to evaluate the e¤ects of the information campaign. Interestingly, Svensson
and Reinikka nd large quantitative e¤ects of improved access to public information.
Finally, Brunetti and Weder (2003) have studied the connection between mass media and
corruption. Based on the hypothesis that a free press will raise the costs of extracting bribes
by increasing the probability of being detected and punished, they analyze the empirical
association between press freedom and corruption in a sample of countries during the 1994-
1998 period. They report evidence of a signicant relationship between more press freedom
and less corruption.
2.2 Other determinants of corruption
Other papers have focused on di¤erent determinants of corruption. In what follows we outline
some recent published contributions. In a very comprehensive study Treisman (2000), using
di¤erent measures of corruption and a variety of possible determinants, nds that historical
indicators such as protestant tradition and a history of British rule are at least as important
in explaining the level of corruption as current policies. More specically, being a former
British colony, having a protestant tradition, having a longer-term uninterrupted democracy
and being economically developed are robustly associated with less corruption. Due to the
lack of suitable instruments the paper leaves out suggestions about the direction of causation.
Persson et al. (2003) analyze how electoral rules a¤ect political corruption using a sample
of democracies during the 1990-1998 period. They show that countries with smaller voting
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districts tend to have more corruption. The mechanism driving this result may be that
larger electoral districts lower barriers of entry for new candidates. This in turn increases
political competition and hence reduces corruption. However, this result is not robust to
the use of di¤erent specications. A more robust nding in Persson et al. is that countries
predominantly voting for individuals have less corruption than countries in which politicians
are elected from party lists. The reason is that the latter reduces individual accountability.
Fisman and Gatti (2002) focus on the association between decentralization and corrup-
tion. Decentralization may help reduce corruption by making it easier to monitor bureau-
crats. Yet decentralization can also lead to ine¢ ciency in the provision of public services.
Using a measure of decentralization, dened as the sub-national share of total government
spending, and controlling for the possibility that larger countries have a lower ratio of public
service outlets per capita, Fisman and Gatti report a robust negative relationship between
decentralization in government expenditure and corruption. Moreover, using IV techniques
they argue that causality runs from a higher degree of decentralization to lower levels of
corruption.
Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) analyze the e¤ect of wages in civil service on corruption.
Low salaries may give public servants incentives to supplement their incomes by taking
bribes. However, if wages are perceived as being fair it may be feasible to have low levels of
corruption and low levels of remuneration. With a basic specication including the ratio of
government wages to manufacturing wages they are able to nd a robust negative relationship
between relative civil-service pay and corruption.
Ades and Di Tella (1999) study the e¤ects of competition on corruption. From a theo-
retical point of view more competition reduces the amount of rents bureaucrats can extract
from rms. At the same time it becomes less valuable for society to avoid corruption, re-
sulting in less control of bureaucrats. The e¤ect of competition on corruption is therefore a
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priori ambiguous. Ades and Di Tella (1999) show that in countries where rms earn more,
corruption levels are also higher.
Finally, two studies focus on the e¤ect of women in parliament on the level of corruption.
Women are perceived as being more trust-worthy and public-spirited than men. A higher
representation of women in parliament should therefore be associated with lower levels of
corruption. Dollar et al. (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001) both report results in favour of
this hypothesis.
3 Empirical Baseline Model
We are interested in estimating the following model:
CPI i;t = +   INTERNET i;t 1 +   eGOV i+
 GDPCAP i +   PRESSi;t 1 +Xi;t 10 + "i;t (1)
The dependent variable, CPIi;t; is the value of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from
Transparency International (TI) for country i in year t. The index is constructed annually
from a number of individual surveys of businessmen, the local population, and from ratings by
economic risk analysts and country experts. The CPI score ranges between 10 (no corruption)
and zero (endemic corruption). We use CPI data covering the 1998-2003 period.9
We rely on two ICT variables, viz. INTERNETi;t 1 and eGOVi: The Internet variable
is the number of Internet users per 1,000 people and is taken from World Development
Indicators (WDI) 2004. INTERNETi;t 1 covers the 1997-2002 period, i.e. it is lagged one
9The CPI is highly correlated with the other frequently used corruption measures (see Treisman, 2000).
In fact, the correlation between the graft measure of Kaufmann et al. (2005) and CPI is 0.974 in our sample.
However, the graft measure is only available biannually. We note that the conclusions of the present paper
also holds up with the graft measure.
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period compared to CPI.10 The e-government variable is a time-independent dummy variable,
which takes the value one if a country is classied as either interactive or transactional in
the United Nations (2002) report described in Section 1 (recall no country was classied as
seamless). Hence, in all countries where eGOVi = 1 Internet users could (in 2001) download
forms, contact o¢ cials, and make appointments and requests. As argued in Section 1 the
interface channel operates through the online presence of these services.11
As several of the papers referred to in Section 2 control for freedom of speech we include
a measure of press freedom, PRESSi;t 1; assembled by Freedom House. PRESSi;t 1 ranges
between zero (freedom) and 100 (no freedom).12 We also include initial (1990 values) real
GDP per capita, GDPCAPi; to control for the overall social and economic development.13
Xi;t 1  [X0t 1 : X1i : X2i;t 1] is a vector of predetermined regressors. X0t 1 includes a time
dummy and geographical dummies; X1i includes legal origin dummies and indices of ethnic,
religious and linguistic fractionalization (all from Alesina et al., 2003); X2it 1 includes the
government consumption expenditure share of GDP, the trade share of GDP, population size
(log) (all from WDI, 2004) and the percentage of seats occupied by women in parliament
(from the Women in Parliament database).14
10Subscript t  1 always means that the variable of interest is lagged one period compared to CPIi;t; e.g.
INTERNETi;t 1; absence of subscribt t  1 means that the variable is constant over time, e.g. eGOVi.
11The interface channel does not operate in environments classied as emerging or enhanced.
12We also used the Gastil index of civil liberties from Freedom House and the Polity IV democracy index
provided by the Center for International Development and Conict Management as proxies for freedom of
speech. This did not change the qualitative results reported in the paper.
13We use initial real GDP per capita since GDP per capita is probably endogenous (Bardhan, 1997).
14We use the lower house if there are two chambers.
12
4 Results
4.1 OLS estimation
Table 1 shows the pooled OLS results.15 All t-values are based on a fully robust variance
estimator.16 Column (1) provides OLS results for equation (1) with only the X0t 1 part
of Xi;t 1 included. The Internet variable has the expected positive sign and is signicant
at one percent: corruption is lower in countries with more Internet users. However, e-
government is insignicant at conventional levels. Initial real GDP per capita is positive and
signicant at one percent: economically more developed countries experience less widespread
corruption. The negative sign on press freedom corroborates the ndings of Brunetti and
Weder (2003) that countries with a free press experience less corruption. Interestingly,
our basic specication explains 80 percent of the variation in CPI. Moreover, column (2)
demonstrates that excluding OECD countries from the sample has little e¤ect.
Several papers reviewed in Section 2 found that religious, linguistic and ethnic frac-
tionalization and legal origin dummies are important (deep) determinants of the quality of
governance. Columns (3) and (4) adds such controls, i.e. includes [X0t 1 : X
1
i ]. Results are
robust with respect to the inclusion of these deep determinants.
In columns (5) and (6) we add additional controls. Small countries and decentralized
countries are likely to experience less corruption (Fisman and Gatti, 2002); the former may
be better at establishing a well-functioning administration, whereas politicians are probably
more intensively monitored in the latter. We therefore include population size (log) and
the total government expenditure share of GDP as indicators of size and decentralization,
15In this section we do not worry about orthogonality between explanatory variables and the error term.
It is therefore worth recalling that OLS (assuming ergodic stationary) gives a consistent estimate of the least
squares projection (the best linear predictor) (see Hayashi, 2000).
16The variance estimator is robust with respect to (arbitrary) heteroscedasticity and (arbitrary) serial
correlation across time. We only require that observations are independent across countries.
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Table 1: Pooled OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
INTERNET 0:007 0:008 0:005 0:007 0:003 0:007
(4:63) (4:59) (4:23) (4:36) (3:07) (2:58)
eGOV 0:210 0:067 0:226 0:073 0:338 0:216
(0:89) (0:31) (1:10) (0:36) (1:32) (0:76)
GDPCAP 0:091 0:188 0:098 0:152 0:077 0:100
(3:77) (3:68) (5:03) (2:90) (6:37) (1:53)
PRESS  0:020  0:015  0:018  0:015  0:014  0:012
(2:57) (2:63) (2:82) (2:86) (2:06) (1:63)
Controls 1 No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls 2 No No No No Yes Yes
Excluding OECD No Yes No Yes No Yes
Total observations 543 406 528 397 467 340
(No. of countries) 117 94 113 91 103 81
R-squared 0:80 0:63 0:85 0:67 0:89 0:65
Dependent variable: Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 1998 - 2003. OLS estimates; t-statistics, which are
fully robust with respect to (arbitrary) heteroscedasticity and (arbitrary) serial correlation across time, are
reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate signicance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. All regressions
include a constant term, time dummies and geographical dummies. Controls 1: legal origin dummies,
indices of linguistic, religious and ethnic fractionalization; Controls 2: women in parliament, openness,
population (log), and government expenditure share of GDP.
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respectively. We also include openness, measured as imports plus exports as a share of GDP,
to proxy market structure and the degree of competition (Ades and Di Tella, 1999). Finally
we include the percentage of seats occupied by women in parliament: women are considered
more honest than men and hence less likely to accept bribes (Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al.,
2001). Consequently, all elements of Xi;t 1 are included in columns (5) and (6). Columns
(5) and (6) show that the coe¢ cient on INTERNETi;t 1 remains signicant at one and
ve percent, respectively. eGOVi remains insignicant in both columns. Press freedom and
initial real GDP per capita turn insignicant in the sample where OECD countries have been
excluded.
4.2 GMM and xed e¤ects estimation
According to an OECD report e-government became one of the six pillars of the Mexican
Presidential Agenda for Good Governance in 2002. In fact, e-government is widely seen as
a tool to improve transparency, quality and e¢ ciency of government (OECD, 2005). This
suggests that e-government may be a function of the level of corruption. Moreover, the
number of Internet users may be a function of the level of e-government. As is well-known,
in such cases OLS yields inconsistent and biased estimates of the causal e¤ect (Bound et al.,
1995). In order to tackle this endogeneity problem we resort to GMM techniques.
In equation (1), if eGOVi and INTERNETi;t 1 are endogenous then E (eGOVi  "i;t) 6=
0 and E (INTERNETi;t 1  "i;t) 6= 0: Hence, we need to instrument these two variables.
In addition, instead of using real GDP per capita in 1990, GDPCAPi; as done in the
OLS estimations above, we instrument current real GDP per capita, GDPCAPi;t 1; using
GDPCAPi: This improves e¢ ciency.
Dene the vector of instruments as Z 0i;t 1 = [zi1;t 1; ::; ziM;t 1 : Xi;t 1]: We require that
E (Zi;t 1  "i;t) = 0: In our estimations, where M = 5; we have that zi1;t 1; zi2;t 1; zi2::; zi5
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equal the share of the population aged 0 to 14 years, the share of the population residing
in urban areas, initial (1990) real GDP per capita, power transmission and distribution
losses, and the number of telephone mainlines per 1,000 people, respectively (all taken from
WDI, 2004). In particular, the share of the population aged 0 to 14 years and the share
of the population residing in urban areas have been found to explain Internet penetration
rates by Chinn and Farlie (2004). Power transmission and distribution losses (a proxy for
the realiability of the power supply) and the number of telephone mainlines are important
determinants of the quality of the infrastructure needed to sustain ICT. These variables
explain one-third of the variation in e-government. We test the validity of all instruments
below.
Compared to Table 1 the GMM coe¢ cients associated with INTERNETi;t 1 and eGOVi
in Table 2 are always higher than the corresponding OLS estimates. This is an indication
of endogeneity bias. Note also that all our instruments are valid: in each column in Table
2 the Hansen J statistic, a test for over-identifying restrictions, indicates validity; the tests
of excluded instruments indicate strong partial correlations in all rst-stage regressions (see
Bound et al., 1995).
The salient features of Table 2 is that INTERNETi;t 1 enters signicantly in all columns.
This provides strong empirical support for the existence of an information channel. The e-
government variable is marginally signicant in columns (1) to (4). In columns (5) and (6)
eGOVi is insignicant. However, a F-test of the restriction that three of the four Controls 2
variables (population size, government expenditure and openness) are zero cannot be rejected
at signicance levels below 0.63 and 0.64 in columns (5) and (6), respectively. When these
three variables are excluded (i.e. only women in parliament is retained), eGOVi enters
marginally signicant in both columns (not reported). Overall, this provides some support
to the existence of an interface channel as well.
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Table 2: GMM estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
INTERNET 0:013 0:024 0:010 0:021 0:006 0:028
(3:71) (2:99) (2:59) (2:86) (1:85) (2:23)
eGOV 1:232 1:028 1:337 1:114 1:167 0:295
(1:67) (1:95) (1:93) (1:96) (1:27) (0:29)
GDPCAP 0:033  0:068 0:058  0:040 0:058  0:140
(1:17) (0:63) (2:83) (0:42) (4:30) (0:99)
PRESS 0:000 0:007  0:002 0:005  0:002 0:006
(0:004) (0:79) (0:18) (0:57) (0:18) (0:61)
Controls 1 No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls 2 No No No No Yes Yes
Excluding OECD No Yes No Yes No Yes
Hansens J statistic 0:45 1:33 1:30 0:45 1:05 0:63
F(excluded instruments 1) 110:9 97:1 33:9 57:5 18:0 21:7
F(excluded instruments 2) 24:1 23:3 23:4 20:7 18:3 14:9
F(excluded instruments 3) 2534:0 1726:7 1481:8 1275:8 1772:0 806:7
Total observations 494 357 479 348 424 297
No. of countries 101 78 97 75 89 67
R-squared 0:76 0:42 0:83 0:51 0:88 0:34
Dependent variable: Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 1998 - 2003. GMM estimation. We use a cluster-
robust optimal weighting matrix: all t-values (reported in parenthesis) are fully robust with respect to
arbitrary heteroscedasticity and arbitrary intra-country (intra-cluster) correlation (see Wooldridge, 2002:
193). Asterisks *, **, *** indicate signicance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All regressions
included a constant term, time and geographical dummies. Controls 1 and Controls 2; see Table 1. Hansens
J statistic, distributed here as 2(2), is a test for overidentifying restrictions (Hayashi, 2000). The test of
excluded instruments is a F-test of exclusion of the instruments from the rst-stage regressions (see Bound
et al., 1995; Staiger and Stock, 1997). Excluded instruments 1, 2 and 3 relates to the INTERNET, eGOV
and GDPCAP rst-stage regressions, respectively.
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Table 3: Fixed e¤ects estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
INTERNET 0:001 0:001 0:001 0:001
(3:29) (2:29) (3:14) (1:76)
PRESS  0:004 0:004
(0:99) (1:00)
Excluding OECD No Yes No Yes
Total observations 588 445 582 439
No. of countries 133 109 132 108
R-squared (within) 0:03 0:05 0:03 0:05
Dependent variable: Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 1998 - 2003. Fixed
e¤ects estimation. The test for serial correlation reported in Wooldridge
(2002: 275) did not detect any problems. For this reason the variance
estimator is only robust with respect to heteroscedasticity (Huber-White
corrected). Robust t-values in parenthesis. Asterisks *, **, *** indicate
signicance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All regressions included
time dummies.
Columns (3) and (4) constitute our preferred specications since they provide a bal-
ance between su¢ cient control variables and sample size considerations. Column (4), where
OECD countries have been excluded, is particularly interesting because the two ICT vari-
ables, INTERNETi;t 1 and eGOVi; have statistical signicance at one and ve percent,
respectively. Hence rich countries do not drive the results. Columns (3) and (4) are also
robust with respect to the choice of instrumental variables estimator. The results hold up
in a 2SLS setup with fully robust standard errors (not reported) and in a GMM setup with
a small sample correction and fully robust standard errors (not reported).17
Table 3 reports results from the xed e¤ects estimator. Note that since both eGOVi
and GDPCAPi are time-constant variables, they are captured by the country xed e¤ects.
Table 3 shows that the Internet variable is signicant in all columns, albeit with a smaller
coe¢ cient estimate as compared to Table 2 (due to limited within variation). Note also that
17The e¢ cient GMM estimator relies on estimations of fourth moments. Since it takes a larger sample
to estimate fourth moments reliably, compared to rst or second moments, GMM probably has worse nite
sample properties than 2SLS (Hayashi, 2000). It is therefore important that both 2SLS and GMM with
small-sample corrections produce similar results as the e¢ cient GMM estimator.
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when OECD countries are excluded, as in columns (2) and (4) in Table 3, we still obtain
statistical signicance at conventional levels. Finally, instrumenting INTERNETi;t 1 in the
xed e¤ects estimation (not reported) does not change the conclusions of Table 3.
In the Appendix we also report results using most of the explanatory variables mentioned
in Section 2.2. This reduces the sample size considerably. Nevertheless, all conclusions hold
up.
Overall, we are led to the conclusion that causation is running from more ICT to less
corruption.
4.3 Economic signicance
Table 4 reports the standardized (beta) coe¢ cients associated with columns (1), (3) and (5)
in Table 2, respectively, provided that estimated coe¢ cients are signicant at levels below
10 percent. Inspection of Table 4 reveals that standardized coe¢ cient associated with the
Internet variable are located in the range 0:385 to 0:806. Using column (2), a one standard
deviation increase in Internet users per 1; 000 people translates into an increase in CPI of
roughly 0:58 standard deviation. To see the economic signicance of this magnitude consider
a country like Vietnam with a CPI score of 2:4 in 2003. In 2002 Vietnam had 18 Internet
users per 1; 000 people. If the number of Internet users in Vietnam increased from 18 to 46
(which is the level of China in 2002 and corresponds to a one fth of a standard deviation
increase) our results suggest that the CPI score should increase from 2:4 to approximately
2:7. In 2003 this was equivalent to going from rank 100 to rank 86 in the TI 2003 Corruption
Perception Index.
The beta coe¢ cient associated with e-government makes less sense since this is a discrete
variable. We need to evaluate going from being without e-government (eGOVi = 0) to having
e-government (eGOVi = 1): Carrying out this exercise, i.e. using the estimated coe¢ cient
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Table 4: Standardized coe¢ cients
(1) (2) (3)
INTERNET 0:806 0:576 0:385
eGOV 0:230 0:247
GDPCAP 0:308 0:315
Standardized Coe¢ cients: Columns
(1) to (5) are the standardized coe¢ -
cients associated with columns (1) to
(5) in Table 2. The standardized co-
e¢ cients are calculated as b^ = ^x^y  ^,
where ^x is the standard deviation of
the independent variable, ^y is the
standard deviation of the dependent
variable and ^ is the estimated GMM
coe¢ cient (see Wooldridge, 2000). We
have only estimated standardized co-
e¢ cients for signicant coe¢ cients.
on eGOVi;  = 1:337; in column (3), Table 2 and eGOVi = 1, shows that the CPI score
increases by 1:337 CPI points. Continuing the Vietnam counterfactual, going from having
no e-government (Vietnam is classied as having no e-government in our sample) to having
an "average" level of e-government would move Vietnam from rank 100 to rank 59 in the TI
2003 ranking.
Care must be taken when interpreting these magnitudes. Wilson (2004), for instance,
argues convincingly that the di¤usion of ICT technologies is dependent upon a myriad of
complex factors and interactions. The above exercise do however indicate that the two ICT
variables carry substantial economic signicance.
5 Concluding Remarks
To our knowledge this paper provides the rst attempt at systematically testing the propo-
sition that ICT exerts a causal inuence on corruption. Using standard cross-country re-
gression techniques we demonstrate that this proposition is indeed supported by the data.
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We have made an attempt at breaking down the causal inuence of ICT in an interface
channel and an information channel. The former channel turns out to have somewhat less
signicance, statistical as well as economic, compared to the latter.
The information channel is surprisingly robust and highly signicant in all specications,
whether or not instruments are used. At the same time the information channel is rooted in
a nascent theoretical literature. Our results should therefore also be seen as a corroboration
of the main propositions found in this literature.
We have not been able to nd any theoretical work on the interface channel, perhaps
because it is so straightforward. Instead we have provided a wave of anecdotal evidence
documenting its potential importance. In the OLS framework this channel is insignicant
in all specications. However, as argued in the paper, e-government is in all likelihood
endogenous. This is supported by our GMM results, which shows that the interface channel
can be given a causal interpretation. The interface channel is less robust than the information
channel. This may be due to the fact that the variable capturing this channel is binary and
only collected once, in 2001. Consequently, it may have too little variation. Better data are
thus needed.
Overall, we acknowledge that results from cross-country regressions should be treated
with some care. We do however believe that the results in this paper underscore the huge
potential of well-designed ICT policies in the ght against corruption.
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Table 5: Appendix
OLS 2SLS GMM
Coe¤ t-statistics Coe¤ t-statistics Coe¤ t-statistics
INTERNET 0:003 (2:64) 0:015 (1:70) 0:020 (2:46)
eGOV 0:290 (0:82) 1:629 (1:17) 1:031 (0:83)
GDPCAP 0:050 (1:29) 0:059 (1:76) 0:046 (1:40)
PRESS  0:015 (1:44)  0:001 (0:07)  0:001 (0:04)
Women 0:059 (3:19) 0:047 (2:01) 0:038 (1:63)
Opennnes 0:001 (0:21)  0:005 (1:26)  0:005 (1:40)
Population size (log)  0:395 (3:13)  0:356 (1:84)  0:250 (1:35)
Gov. expenditure 0:004 (0:16) 0:013 (0:40) 0:012 (0:39)
Black market premium 0:000 (0:19) 0:000 (0:67) 0:000 (1:03)
Schooling 0:001 (0:13)  0:012 (1:08)  0:009 (0:93)
Fuel etc. 0:004 (0:41) 0:001 (0:12)  0:006 (0:64)
Electoral rule 0:673 (2:11) 0:940 (2:56) 0:848 (2:33)
Democracy 0:125 (0:19)  0:826 (0:81)  0:902 (0:90)
Gov. wage  0:050 (0:59)  0:069 (0:79)  0:072 (0:82)
Hansens J statistic 2.56
F(excluded instruments 1) 2.0*
F(excluded instruments 2) 9.3***
F(excluded instruments 3) 260.2***
Total observations 319 319 319
No. of countries 59 59 59
R-squared 0.91 0.80 0.70
Dependent variable: Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 1998 - 2003. The table includes the
following additional (potential) determinants of corruption: fuels, minerals and metals export
share of total merchandise export, the gross secondary school enrollment ratio (all fromWDI,
2004); the average black market premium from 1996 to 1999 (from World Bank Global
Development Network Database); the average government wage to per capita GDP ratio for
the period 1990-2000 (from World Bank Cross-National Data on Government Employment
and Wages supplemented with data documented in Treisman, 2000); a dummy for whether
a country has been an uninterrupted democracy between 1950 and 1995 (from Treisman,
2000); data on the proportion of legislators in the lower house elected individually or on open
lists (from Persson et al., 2003). All regressions include a constant term, time dummies, legal
origin dummies, indices of linguistic, religious and ethnic fractionalization, and geographical
dummies. Instruments: initial (1990) real GDP per capita, the share of the population
aged 0 to 14 years, the fraction of the population residing in urban areas, latitude (from
CIA Factbook) and average tourist arrivals (1997-2002) (from WDI, 2004). See Table 2 for
additional details.
22
References
[1] Ades, A. and Di Tella, R., 1999. Rents, Competition, and Corruption, American Eco-
nomic Review 89: 982-994.
[2] Bardhan, P. 1997. Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues, Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature 35: 1320-1346.
[3] Besley, T. and Burgess, R., 2001. Political Agency, Government Responsiveness, and
the Role of the Media, European Economic Review 45: 629-640.
[4] Besley, T. and Burgess, R., 2002. The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness:
Theory and Evidence from India, Quarterly Journal of Economics 117: 1415-1451.
[5] Bound, J., Jaeger, D., and Baker, R., 1995. Problems With Instrumental variables Esti-
mation When the Correlation Between the Instruments and the Endogenous Explana-
tory Variable is Weak, Journal of the American Statistical Association 90: 443-450.
[6] Brunetti, A. and Weder, B., 2003. A Free Press is Bad News for Corruption, Journal
of Public Economics 87: 1801-1824.
[7] Chawla, R. and Bhatnagar, S., 2004. Online Delivery of Land Ti-
tles to Rural Farmers in Karnataka, India. Available online at:
<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/reducingpoverty/case-India-BHOOMI.html>
[8] Chinn, M., and Farlie, R., 2004. The Determinants of the Global Digital Divide: A
Cross-Country Analysis of Computer and Internet Penetration, NBER Working Paper
10686.
23
[9] Dollar, D., Fisman, R. and Gatti, R., 2001. Are Women Really the Fairer Sex? Corrup-
tion and Women in Government, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 46:
423-429.
[10] Fink, C. and Kenny, C., 2003. W(h)ither the Digital Divide? The Journal of Policy,
Regulation and Strategy for Telecommunications 5 (6): 15-24.
[11] Fisman, R. and Gatti, R., 2002. Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence Across
Countries, Journal of Public Economics 83: 325-345.
[12] Hayashi, F., 2000. Econometrics, Princeton University Press.
[13] Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M., 2005. Governance Mat-
ters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004. Available online at:
<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/wp-governance.html>
[14] OECD, 2005. OECD e-Government Studies: Mexico Assessment. Available online at:
<http://webdomino1.oecd.org/COMNET/PUM/egovproweb.nsf>
[15] Persson, T., Tabellini, G. and Trebbi, F., 2003. Electoral Rules and Corruption, Journal
of European Economic Association 1: 958-989.
[16] van Rijckeghem, C. and Weder, B., 2001. Bureaucratic Corruption and the Rate of
Temptation: Do wages in the Civil Service A¤ect Corruption, and By How Much?,
Journal of Development Economics 65: 307-331.
[17] Rose, R., 2004. Governance and the Internet. In: Yusuf, S., Altaf, M., Nabeshima, K.,
(Eds.), Global Change and East Asian Policy Initiatives, World Bank Group.
[18] Strömberg, D., 2001. Mass Media and Public Policy, European Economic Review 45:
652-663.
24
[19] Strömberg, D., 2004. Radios Impact on Public Spending, Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 119: 189-221.
[20] Svensson, J. and Reinikka, R., 2003. The Power of Information: Evidence from a News-
paper Campaign to Reduce Capture. Working Paper, Institute for International Eco-
nomic Studies, Stockholm University.
[21] Swamy, A., Knack, S., Lee, Y. and Azfar, O., 2001. Gender and Corruption, Journal of
Development Economics 64: 25-55.
[22] Staiger, D. and Stock, J., 1997. Instrumental variables with Weak Instruments, Econo-
metrica 65: 557-586.
[23] Treisman, D. 2000. The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study, Journal of
Public Economics 76: 399-457.
[24] Wescott, C., 2003. E-government to combat corruption in the Asia Pacic Region.
Available online at: <http://www.adb.org/Governance/egovernment_corruption.pdf>
[25] Wilson III, E., 2004. The Information Revolution and Developing Countries, MIT Press.
[26] Wooldridge, J., 2000. Introductory Econometrics, South-Western.
[27] Wooldridge, J., 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel data, MIT Press.
[28] World Bank, 2004. Making Services Work for the Poor. World Development Report.
25
